Abstract. Growing enterprises are playing more and more important roles in the social and economic development in China. The growing enterprises are also mostly high-tech enterprises, in which the activeness and enthusiasm of the employees directly determine the development status of the company. Effective encouragement for the key employees has become the core of growing enterprise management. Through the empirical study of Chinese growing listed companies, this paper finds that equity incentive can really achieve incentive effect for the growing listed companies, and the proportion of equity incentive and equity incentive mode also have some impact on the effect of equity incentive.
Introduction
Equity incentive first appeared in the United States. In 2005, Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission announced" the management method of equity incentive for listed companies", which provided the basis and support for the listed company's equity incentive in China. How does the implementation of equity incentive affect the company? The implementation effect of equity incentive has become the focus of scholars' study.
Frye (2004) Aboody, Johnson and Kasznik (2010), Conyon and He (2011) found that after the application of equity incentive, the benefit of the enterprise has been significantly increased. Qi Zhai (2013) found that implementation effect of the companies in the growing life period is better than that in the maturity period. Chaodong Yan (2017) found that the incentive model has an impact on the equity incentive effect. But some scholar also gave the different conclusion. Firnletal (2006) , Elsila (2013) took Chinese companies as the research object and found that the effect of equity incentive for the companies is not significant.
Growing enterprises have stronger incentive desire because of their high growth characteristics. In this paper, taking the growing listed companies as research object, the equity incentive effect for growing enterprises is analyzed. Research found that the equity incentive effect under different equity incentive mode is different.
Research Design

Research Hypothesis
According to contract theory, equity incentive is an important tool to deal with the principal-agent problem. Under the incentive mode of equity incentive, business managers achieve the goal of owner while gaining their own benefits. Therefore, we can get the hypothesis 1a and 1b.
Hypothesis 1a: Growing listed companies that have implemented equity incentives have higher operating performance than those that have not implemented equity incentives.
Hypothesis 1b: After the implementation of equity incentive, the growing listed companies have higher performance than before.
The proportion of equity incentive is the key for scheme design. Managers who are awarded more equity incentives can gain more benefits from the company's performance, will work harder and can improve the company's operating performance better. Therefore, we can get the hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive correlation between equity incentive ratio and business performance in growth oriented listed companies.
The frequently-used stock incentive mode is stock option mode and restricted stock mode. Under stock incentive mode, rights and obligations are not equal. Restrictive stocks can only be owned by the holder when the operating performance exceeds the standard. This model has punitive nature. Growing enterprises usually need to invest huge capita. Their pressure of cash flow is great. When facing the problem of capital shortage, stock option model can play an incentive role. Therefore, we can get the hypothesis3 .
Hypothesis 3: Equity incentive mode has an impact on the equity incentive effect of growing listed companies.
Sample Selection and Data Sources
The growth listed companies defined in this paper are those that meet the growth rate of total assets more than 0 for at least three consecutive years, the growth rate of operating income more than 0, the growth rate of operating profit more than 0, and the net cash flow of operating activities more than 0.
The sample selected in this paper is a growing listed company which announces the implementation of equity incentive plan in A-share market from 2013 to 2015 excluding the companies with data shortage, terminating equity incentive and listed companies in the financial industry. 109 growing listed companies were included.
Variable Definitions
Explained Variables. The explained variable in this paper is the implementation effect of equity incentive. Based on the research of scholars at home and abroad, the paper chooses net asset return (ROE) for indicators of business performance.
Explanatory Variables. Equity incentive ratio (RATE).This paper chooses the proportion of equity incentive to total share capital to indicate the proportion of equity incentive. Equity incentive mode (OPTION).The equity incentive mode is set as a dummy variable. If the restricted stock mode OPTION = 1, otherwise OPTION = 0, if the stock option mode OPTION = 1, otherwise OPTION = 0.
Control Variables. In order to ensure the accuracy of the research results, we need to eliminate the impact of other factors affecting business performance and enterprise value. Following control variables are included in the model, which are enterprise size （ LNSIZE）, Nature of the company (XZ), asset-liability ratio (LEV), Ownership concentration (TOP10) and Independent director Billy (DULI).
Model Building
In order to test the hypothesis two, the Model 1 is built as following.
ROE=β0+β1RATE+β2LINSIZE+β3XZ+β4Lev+β5TOP10+β6DULI+ɛ
(1) In order to test the hypothesis three, the Model 2 is built as following.
ROE=γ0+γ1OPTION+γ2LINSIZE+γ3XZ+γ4Lev+γ5TOP10+γ6DULI+ɛ
(2)
Empirical Results Analysis Implementation Effect Test of Equity Incentive
Implementation Effect of Equity Incentive Based on Horizontal Perspective. According to the matching method adopted by Liu Guangsheng (2013), in order to eliminate the impact of company size, industry and year on the implementation of equity incentive effect, this paper select industry, year and scale three indicators to form the control group between the growing listed companies without equity incentive and having implemented equity incentive. Independent sample T test was performed on the two control groups.
In Table 1 , the F statistic of return on net assets is 6.017, Sig = 0.015, which is significant at the 5% level. The test results show that there is a significant difference between the rate of return on net assets of listed companies with and without equity incentives. Implementation Effect of Equity Incentive Based on Longitudinal Perspective. In order to verify the impact of equity incentive on specific companies, the financial data of the growing listed companies before and after the implementation of equity incentive will be compared by paired sample T test as in Table 2 .
For the companies which have implemented equity incentive, the difference of the average return on net assets before and after the implementation of equity incentive is -0.02049676, while Sig = 0.000. The test of 1% significance shows that there is a significant difference between the two years before and after the implementation of equity incentive. The ROE after implementation is better than the ROE before implementation. From results of independent sample T test and paired sample T test, hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 1b are proved. 
Analysis of the Impact of Equity Incentive Ratio on Incentive Effect
For model 1, equity incentive ratio and corporate performance regression analysis are showed in Table 3 . Table 3 shows that the tolerance of each variable in the model is greater than zero and VIF is less than 2, from which we can judge that there is no collinearity problem in the model variables. So the reliability is relatively high. RATE and ROE correlation coefficient is 0.520, Sig = 0.011, which is less than 0.05, which shows that it passed the significance test. The analysis results show that the higher the proportion of equity incentive, the better the business performance of an enterprise. From the regression results, hypothesis 2 is proved. The final regression equation was: ROE=0.195+0.520RATE+0.064LINSIZE+0.077LEV+0.063TOP10-0.082DULI (3)
Analysis of Relationship between Equity Incentive Mode and Enterprise Performance
For model 2, the regression coefficient results are showed in Table 4 . We can see that the tolerance of each variable of the model is greater than zero and the variance expansion factor VIF is between 1 to 2, from which we can judge that there is no collinearity problem in the variables of the model. So the credibility is relatively high. Compared with stock options, the coefficient of restricted stock and ROE is 0.45, Sig=0.008, less than 0.05. The regression coefficient results passed the test of significance. The result showed that using restricted stock, the growth of listed companies operating performance is better than stock option. The regression equation was following.
ROE=0.126+0.014OPTION+0.078LINSIZE+0.090Lev-0.093TOP10-0.098DULI (4) From the analysis above, hypothesis 3 is proved. 
Summary
Through the empirical study of a share growth listed companies, we find that the performance of the companies that have implemented equity incentive is significantly better than those that have not implemented equity incentive. The performance of the companies that have implemented equity incentive is significantly better than that before the implementation. That is to say, the implementation of equity incentive in the growth listed companies is effective. The proportion of equity incentive has a positive impact on the effect of equity incentive for growth listed companies. Within the scope of laws and regulations, the larger the proportion of incentive, the better the effect of equity incentive for growth listed companies is. Compared with other equity incentive modes, the incentive effect of restricted stock is more obvious.
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